Remove support for Debian 9 and Ubuntu 16.04

This commit is contained in:
2020-07-14 09:45:33 +03:00
parent 539f081d4d
commit 72b8b193b5
15 changed files with 5 additions and 5109 deletions

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@ -1,12 +1,6 @@
---
# file: roles/common/handlers/main.yml
- name: restart iptables
service: name=iptables state=restarted
- name: restart iptables-persistent
service: name=iptables-persistent state=restarted
- name: reload sshd
systemd: name={{ sshd_service_name }} state=reloaded

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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
---
# Hosts running Ubuntu 16.04+ and Debian 9+ use systemd init system and should
# use timedatectl as a network time client instead of the standalone ntp client.
# Earlier versions of those distros should use the ntp/ntpd package.
- name: Set timezone
when: timezone is defined and ansible_service_mgr == 'systemd'
@ -16,8 +15,4 @@
apt: name=ntp state=absent update_cache=yes
when: ansible_service_mgr == 'systemd'
- name: Install ntp on old Ubuntu/Debian
apt: name=ntp state=present update_cache=yes
when: ansible_service_mgr != 'systemd'
# vim: set ts=2 sw=2:

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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
*filter
:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
-A INPUT -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p ipv6-icmp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW -m tcp --dport 22 -s ::/0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW -m tcp --dport 80 -s ::/0 -j ACCEPT
{% if extra_iptables_rules is defined %}
{% for rule in extra_iptables_rules %}
{% if ghetto_ipsets[rule.acl].ipv6src is defined %}
-A INPUT -p {{ rule.protocol }} -m state --state NEW -m {{ rule.protocol }} --dport {{ rule.port }} -s {{ ghetto_ipsets[rule.acl].ipv6src }} -j ACCEPT
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
-A INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with icmp6-adm-prohibited
-A FORWARD -j REJECT --reject-with icmp6-adm-prohibited
COMMIT

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@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
*filter
:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
-A INPUT -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW -m tcp --dport 22 -s 0.0.0.0/0 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW -m tcp --dport 80 -s 0.0.0.0/0 -j ACCEPT
{% if extra_iptables_rules is defined %}
{% for rule in extra_iptables_rules %}
-A INPUT -p {{ rule.protocol }} -m state --state NEW -m {{ rule.protocol }} --dport {{ rule.port }} -s {{ ghetto_ipsets[rule.acl].src }} -j ACCEPT
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
-A INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-host-prohibited
-A FORWARD -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-host-prohibited
COMMIT

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@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.100 2016/08/15 12:32:04 naddy Exp $
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
# sshd_config(5) for more information.
# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
# default value.
#Port 22
#AddressFamily any
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#ListenAddress ::
# Supported HostKey algorithms by order of preference.
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
# Ciphers and keying
#RekeyLimit default none
# Logging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
# LogLevel VERBOSE logs user's key fingerprint on login. Needed to have a clear audit track of which key was using to log in.
LogLevel VERBOSE
# Authentication:
#LoginGraceTime 2m
PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
#StrictModes yes
MaxAuthTries 4
#MaxSessions 10
# Password based logins are disabled - only public key based logins are allowed.
AuthenticationMethods publickey
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
#HostbasedAuthentication no
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
# HostbasedAuthentication
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
#PasswordAuthentication yes
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
# some PAM modules and threads)
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
# GSSAPI options
#GSSAPIAuthentication no
#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
UsePAM yes
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#GatewayPorts no
X11Forwarding no
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PermitTTY yes
PrintMotd no
#PrintLastLog yes
#TCPKeepAlive yes
#UseLogin no
#UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox
#PermitUserEnvironment no
#Compression delayed
#ClientAliveInterval 0
#ClientAliveCountMax 3
#UseDNS no
#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
#MaxStartups 10:30:100
#PermitTunnel no
#ChrootDirectory none
#VersionAddendum none
# no default banner path
#Banner none
# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
#Match User anoncvs
# X11Forwarding no
# AllowTcpForwarding no
# PermitTTY no
# ForceCommand cvs server
# Originally from: https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html
# ... but with ciphers and MACs with < 256 bits removed, as NSA's Suite B now
# does away with these! See: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
# only allow shell access by provisioning user
AllowUsers {{ provisioning_user.name }}

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@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
# Package generated configuration file
# See the sshd_config(5) manpage for details
# What ports, IPs and protocols we listen for
Port 22
# Use these options to restrict which interfaces/protocols sshd will bind to
#ListenAddress ::
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
Protocol 2
# HostKeys for protocol version 2
# Supported HostKey algorithms by order of preference.
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
#Privilege Separation is turned on for security
UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
KeyRegenerationInterval 3600
ServerKeyBits 1024
# Logging
SyslogFacility AUTH
# LogLevel VERBOSE logs user's key fingerprint on login. Needed to have a clear audit track of which key was using to log in.
LogLevel VERBOSE
# Authentication:
LoginGraceTime 120
PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
StrictModes yes
# Password based logins are disabled - only public key based logins are allowed.
AuthenticationMethods publickey
RSAAuthentication yes
PubkeyAuthentication yes
#AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
IgnoreRhosts yes
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts
RhostsRSAAuthentication no
# similar for protocol version 2
HostbasedAuthentication no
# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes
# To enable empty passwords, change to yes (NOT RECOMMENDED)
PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
# some PAM modules and threads)
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
# Change to no to disable tunnelled clear text passwords
PasswordAuthentication yes
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
# GSSAPI options
GSSAPIAuthentication no
GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
X11Forwarding no
X11DisplayOffset 10
PrintMotd no
PrintLastLog yes
TCPKeepAlive yes
#UseLogin no
MaxAuthTries 4
#MaxStartups 10:30:60
#Banner /etc/issue.net
# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
UsePAM yes
# Originally from: https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html
# ... but with ciphers and MACs with < 256 bits removed, as NSA's Suite B now
# does away with these! See: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
# only allow shell access by provisioning user
AllowUsers {{ provisioning_user.name }}