--- title: "November, 2017" date: 2017-11-02T09:37:54+02:00 author: "Alan Orth" tags: ["Notes"] --- ## 2017-11-01 - The CORE developers responded to say they are looking into their bot not respecting our robots.txt ## 2017-11-02 - Today there have been no hits by CORE and no alerts from Linode (coincidence?) ``` # grep -c "CORE" /var/log/nginx/access.log 0 ``` - Generate list of authors on CGSpace for Peter to go through and correct: ``` dspace=# \copy (select distinct text_value, count(*) as count from metadatavalue where metadata_field_id = (select metadata_field_id from metadatafieldregistry where element = 'contributor' and qualifier = 'author') AND resource_type_id = 2 group by text_value order by count desc) to /tmp/authors.csv with csv; COPY 54701 ``` - Abenet asked if it would be possible to generate a report of items in Listing and Reports that had "International Fund for Agricultural Development" as the *only* investor - I opened a ticket with Atmire to ask if this was possible: https://tracker.atmire.com/tickets-cgiar-ilri/view-ticket?id=540 - Work on making the thumbnails in the item view clickable - Basically, once you read the METS XML for an item it becomes easy to trace the structure to find the bitstream link ``` //mets:fileSec/mets:fileGrp[@USE='CONTENT']/mets:file/mets:FLocat[@LOCTYPE='URL']/@xlink:href ``` - METS XML is available for all items with this pattern: /metadata/handle/10568/95947/mets.xml - I whipped up a quick hack to print a clickable link with this URL on the thumbnail but it needs to check a few corner cases, like when there is a thumbnail but no content bitstream! - Help proof fifty-three CIAT records for Sisay: https://dspacetest.cgiar.org/handle/10568/95895 - A handful of issues with `cg.place` using format like "Lima, PE" instead of "Lima, Peru" - Also, some dates like with completely invalid format like "2010- 06" and "2011-3-28" - I also collapsed some consecutive whitespace on a handful of fields ## 2017-11-03 - Atmire got back to us to say that they estimate it will take two days of labor to implement the change to Listings and Reports - I said I'd ask Abenet if she wants that feature ## 2017-11-04 - I finished looking through Sisay's CIAT records for the "Alianzas de Aprendizaje" data - I corrected about half of the authors to standardize them - Linode emailed this morning to say that the CPU usage was high again, this time at 6:14AM - It's the first time in a few days that this has happened - I had a look to see what was going on, but it isn't the CORE bot: ``` # awk '{print $1}' /var/log/nginx/access.log | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 306 68.180.229.31 323 61.148.244.116 414 66.249.66.91 507 40.77.167.16 618 157.55.39.161 652 207.46.13.103 666 157.55.39.254 1173 104.196.152.243 1737 66.249.66.90 23101 138.201.52.218 ``` - 138.201.52.218 is from some Hetzner server, and I see it making 40,000 requests yesterday too, but none before that: ``` # zgrep -c 138.201.52.218 /var/log/nginx/access.log* /var/log/nginx/access.log:24403 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1:45958 /var/log/nginx/access.log.2.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.3.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.4.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.5.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.6.gz:0 ``` - It's clearly a bot as it's making tens of thousands of requests, but it's using a "normal" user agent: ``` Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2227.0 Safari/537.36 ``` - For now I don't know what this user is! ## 2017-11-05 - Peter asked if I could fix the appearance of "International Livestock Research Institute" in the author lookup during item submission - It looks to be just an issue with the user interface expecting authors to have both a first and last name: ![Author lookup](/cgspace-notes/2017/11/author-lookup.png) ![Add author](/cgspace-notes/2017/11/add-author.png) - But in the database the authors are correct (none with weird `, /` characters): ``` dspace=# select distinct text_value, authority, confidence from metadatavalue value where resource_type_id=2 and metadata_field_id=3 and text_value like 'International Livestock Research Institute%'; text_value | authority | confidence --------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+------------ International Livestock Research Institute | 8f3865dc-d056-4aec-90b7-77f49ab4735c | 0 International Livestock Research Institute | f4db1627-47cd-4699-b394-bab7eba6dadc | 0 International Livestock Research Institute | | -1 International Livestock Research Institute | 8f3865dc-d056-4aec-90b7-77f49ab4735c | 600 International Livestock Research Institute | f4db1627-47cd-4699-b394-bab7eba6dadc | -1 International Livestock Research Institute | | 600 International Livestock Research Institute | 8f3865dc-d056-4aec-90b7-77f49ab4735c | -1 International Livestock Research Institute | 8f3865dc-d056-4aec-90b7-77f49ab4735c | 500 (8 rows) ``` - So I'm not sure if this is just a graphical glitch or if editors have to edit this metadata field prior to approval - Looking at monitoring Tomcat's JVM heap with Prometheus, it looks like we need to use JMX + [jmx_exporter](https://github.com/prometheus/jmx_exporter) - This guide shows how to [enable JMX in Tomcat](https://geekflare.com/enable-jmx-tomcat-to-monitor-administer/) by modifying `CATALINA_OPTS` - I was able to successfully connect to my local Tomcat with jconsole! ## 2017-11-07 - CGSpace when down and up a few times this morning, first around 3AM, then around 7 - Tsega had to restart Tomcat 7 to fix it temporarily - I will start by looking at bot usage (access.log.1 includes usage until 6AM today): ``` # cat /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 619 65.49.68.184 840 65.49.68.199 924 66.249.66.91 1131 68.180.229.254 1583 66.249.66.90 1953 207.46.13.103 1999 207.46.13.80 2021 157.55.39.161 2034 207.46.13.36 4681 104.196.152.243 ``` - 104.196.152.243 seems to be a top scraper for a few weeks now: ``` # zgrep -c 104.196.152.243 /var/log/nginx/access.log* /var/log/nginx/access.log:336 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1:4681 /var/log/nginx/access.log.2.gz:3531 /var/log/nginx/access.log.3.gz:3532 /var/log/nginx/access.log.4.gz:5786 /var/log/nginx/access.log.5.gz:8542 /var/log/nginx/access.log.6.gz:6988 /var/log/nginx/access.log.7.gz:7517 /var/log/nginx/access.log.8.gz:7211 /var/log/nginx/access.log.9.gz:2763 ``` - This user is responsible for hundreds and sometimes thousands of Tomcat sessions: ``` $ grep 104.196.152.243 dspace.log.2017-11-07 | grep -o -E 'session_id=[A-Z0-9]{32}' | sort -n | uniq | wc -l 954 $ grep 104.196.152.243 dspace.log.2017-11-03 | grep -o -E 'session_id=[A-Z0-9]{32}' | sort -n | uniq | wc -l 6199 $ grep 104.196.152.243 dspace.log.2017-11-01 | grep -o -E 'session_id=[A-Z0-9]{32}' | sort -n | uniq | wc -l 7051 ``` - The worst thing is that this user never specifies a user agent string so we can't lump it in with the other bots using the Tomcat Session Crawler Manager Valve - They don't request dynamic URLs like "/discover" but they seem to be fetching handles from XMLUI instead of REST (and some with `//handle`, note the regex below): ``` # grep -c 104.196.152.243 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 4681 # grep 104.196.152.243 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c -P 'GET //?handle' 4618 ``` - I just realized that `ciat.cgiar.org` points to 104.196.152.243, so I should contact Leroy from CIAT to see if we can change their scraping behavior - The next IP (207.46.13.36) seem to be Microsoft's bingbot, but all its requests specify the "bingbot" user agent and there are no requests for dynamic URLs that are forbidden, like "/discover": ``` $ grep -c 207.46.13.36 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 2034 # grep 207.46.13.36 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "GET /discover" 0 ``` - The next IP (157.55.39.161) also seems to be bingbot, and none of its requests are for URLs forbidden by robots.txt either: ``` # grep 157.55.39.161 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "GET /discover" 0 ``` - The next few seem to be bingbot as well, and they declare a proper user agent and do not request dynamic URLs like "/discover": ``` # grep -c -E '207.46.13.[0-9]{2,3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 5997 # grep -E '207.46.13.[0-9]{2,3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "bingbot" 5988 # grep -E '207.46.13.[0-9]{2,3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "GET /discover" 0 ``` - The next few seem to be Googlebot, and they declare a proper user agent and do not request dynamic URLs like "/discover": ``` # grep -c -E '66.249.66.[0-9]{2,3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 3048 # grep -E '66.249.66.[0-9]{2,3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c Google 3048 # grep -E '66.249.66.[0-9]{2,3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "GET /discover" 0 ``` - The next seems to be Yahoo, which declares a proper user agent and does not request dynamic URLs like "/discover": ``` # grep -c 68.180.229.254 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 1131 # grep 68.180.229.254 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "GET /discover" 0 ``` - The last of the top ten IPs seems to be some bot with a weird user agent, but they are not behaving too well: ``` # grep -c -E '65.49.68.[0-9]{3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 2950 # grep -E '65.49.68.[0-9]{3}' /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c "GET /discover" 330 ``` - Their user agents vary, ie: - `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/61.0.3163.100 Safari/537.36` - `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.11 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/23.0.1271.97 Safari/537.11` - `Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)` - I'll just keep an eye on that one for now, as it only made a few hundred requests to dynamic discovery URLs - While it's not in the top ten, Baidu is one bot that seems to not give a fuck: ``` # grep -c Baiduspider /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 8068 # grep Baiduspider /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -c -E "GET /(browse|discover)" 1431 ``` - According to their documentation their bot [respects `robots.txt`](http://www.baidu.com/search/robots_english.html), but I don't see this being the case - I think I will end up blocking Baidu as well... - Next is for me to look and see what was happening specifically at 3AM and 7AM when the server crashed - I should look in nginx access.log, rest.log, oai.log, and DSpace's dspace.log.2017-11-07 - Here are the top IPs making requests to XMLUI from 2–8 AM: ``` # cat /var/log/nginx/access.log /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -E '07/Nov/2017:0[2-8]' | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 279 66.249.66.91 373 65.49.68.199 446 68.180.229.254 470 104.196.152.243 470 197.210.168.174 598 207.46.13.103 603 157.55.39.161 637 207.46.13.80 703 207.46.13.36 724 66.249.66.90 ``` - Of those, most are Google, Bing, Yahoo, etc, except 63.143.42.244 and 63.143.42.242 which are Uptime Robot - Here are the top IPs making requests to REST from 2–8 AM: ``` # cat /var/log/nginx/rest.log /var/log/nginx/rest.log.1 | grep -E '07/Nov/2017:0[2-8]' | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 8 207.241.229.237 10 66.249.66.90 16 104.196.152.243 25 41.60.238.61 26 157.55.39.161 27 207.46.13.103 27 207.46.13.80 31 207.46.13.36 1498 50.116.102.77 ``` - The OAI requests during that same time period are nothing to worry about: ``` # cat /var/log/nginx/oai.log /var/log/nginx/oai.log.1 | grep -E '07/Nov/2017:0[2-8]' | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 1 66.249.66.92 4 66.249.66.90 6 68.180.229.254 ``` - The top IPs from dspace.log during the 2–8 AM period: ``` $ grep -E '2017-11-07 0[2-8]' dspace.log.2017-11-07 | grep -o -E 'ip_addr=[0-9.]+' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 143 ip_addr=213.55.99.121 181 ip_addr=66.249.66.91 223 ip_addr=157.55.39.161 248 ip_addr=207.46.13.80 251 ip_addr=207.46.13.103 291 ip_addr=207.46.13.36 297 ip_addr=197.210.168.174 312 ip_addr=65.49.68.199 462 ip_addr=104.196.152.243 488 ip_addr=66.249.66.90 ``` - These aren't actually very interesting, as the top few are Google, CIAT, Bingbot, and a few other unknown scrapers - The number of requests isn't even that high to be honest - As I was looking at these logs I noticed another heavy user (124.17.34.59) that was not active during this time period, but made many requests today alone: ``` # zgrep -c 124.17.34.59 /var/log/nginx/access.log* /var/log/nginx/access.log:22581 /var/log/nginx/access.log.1:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.2.gz:14 /var/log/nginx/access.log.3.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.4.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.5.gz:3 /var/log/nginx/access.log.6.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.7.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.8.gz:0 /var/log/nginx/access.log.9.gz:1 ``` - The whois data shows the IP is from China, but the user agent doesn't really give any clues: ``` # grep 124.17.34.59 /var/log/nginx/access.log | awk -F'" ' '{print $3}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -h 210 "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/61.0.3163.100 Safari/537.36" 22610 "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.2; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; LCTE)" ``` - A Google search for "LCTE bot" doesn't return anything interesting, but this [Stack Overflow discussion](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42500881/what-is-lcte-in-user-agent) references the lack of information - So basically after a few hours of looking at the log files I am not closer to understanding what is going on! - I do know that we want to block Baidu, though, as it does not respect `robots.txt` - And as we speak Linode alerted that the outbound traffic rate is very high for the past two hours (about 12–14 hours) - At least for now it seems to be that new Chinese IP (124.17.34.59): ``` # grep -E "07/Nov/2017:1[234]:" /var/log/nginx/access.log | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq -c | sort -h | tail 198 207.46.13.103 203 207.46.13.80 205 207.46.13.36 218 157.55.39.161 249 45.5.184.221 258 45.5.187.130 386 66.249.66.90 410 197.210.168.174 1896 104.196.152.243 11005 124.17.34.59 ``` - Seems 124.17.34.59 are really downloading all our PDFs, compared to the next top active IPs during this time! ``` # grep -E "07/Nov/2017:1[234]:" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep 124.17.34.59 | grep -c pdf 5948 # grep -E "07/Nov/2017:1[234]:" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep 104.196.152.243 | grep -c pdf 0 ``` - About CIAT, I think I need to encourage them to specify a user agent string for their requests, because they are not reuising their Tomcat session and they are creating thousands of sessions per day - All CIAT requests vs unique ones: ``` $ grep -Io -E 'session_id=[A-Z0-9]{32}:ip_addr=104.196.152.243' dspace.log.2017-11-07 | wc -l 3506 $ grep -Io -E 'session_id=[A-Z0-9]{32}:ip_addr=104.196.152.243' dspace.log.2017-11-07 | sort | uniq | wc -l 3506 ``` - I emailed CIAT about the session issue, user agent issue, and told them they should not scrape the HTML contents of communities, instead using the REST API - About Baidu, I found a link to their [robots.txt tester tool](http://ziyuan.baidu.com/robots/) - It seems like our robots.txt file is valid, and they claim to recognize that URLs like `/discover` should be forbidden (不允许, aka "not allowed"): ![Baidu robots.txt tester](/cgspace-notes/2017/11/baidu-robotstxt.png) - But they literally just made this request today: ``` 180.76.15.136 - - [07/Nov/2017:06:25:11 +0000] "GET /discover?filtertype_0=crpsubject&filter_relational_operator_0=equals&filter_0=WATER%2C+LAND+AND+ECOSYSTEMS&filtertype=subject&filter_relational_operator=equals&filter=WATER+RESOURCES HTTP/1.1" 200 82265 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)" ``` - Along with another thousand or so requests to URLs that are forbidden in robots.txt today alone: ``` # grep -c Baiduspider /var/log/nginx/access.log 3806 # grep Baiduspider /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep -c -E "GET /(browse|discover|search-filter)" 1085 ``` - I will think about blocking their IPs but they have 164 of them! ``` # grep "Baiduspider/2.0" /var/log/nginx/access.log | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq | wc -l 164 ``` ## 2017-11-08 - Linode sent several alerts last night about CPU usage and outbound traffic rate at 6:13PM - Linode sent another alert about CPU usage in the morning at 6:12AM - Jesus, the new Chinese IP (124.17.34.59) has downloaded 24,000 PDFs in the last 24 hours: ``` # cat /var/log/nginx/access.log /var/log/nginx/access.log.1 | grep -E "0[78]/Nov/2017:" | grep 124.17.34.59 | grep -v pdf.jpg | grep -c pdf 24981 ``` - This is about 20,000 Tomcat sessions: ``` $ cat dspace.log.2017-11-07 dspace.log.2017-11-08 | grep -Io -E 'session_id=[A-Z0-9]{32}:ip_addr=124.17.34.59' | sort | uniq | wc -l 20733 ``` - I'm getting really sick of this - Sisay re-uploaded the CIAT records that I had already corrected earlier this week, erasing all my corrections - I had to re-correct all the publishers, places, names, dates, etc and apply the changes on DSpace Test - Run system updates on DSpace Test and reboot the server - Magdalena had written to say that two of their Phase II project tags were missing on CGSpace, so I added them ([#346](https://github.com/ilri/DSpace/pull/346)) - I figured out a way to use nginx's map function to assign a "bot" user agent to misbehaving clients who don't define a user agent - Most bots are automatically lumped into one generic session by [Tomcat's Crawler Session Manager Valve](https://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-7.0-doc/config/valve.html#Crawler_Session_Manager_Valve) but this only works if their user agent matches a pre-defined regular expression like `.*[bB]ot.*` - Some clients send thousands of requests without a user agent which ends up creating thousands of Tomcat sessions, wasting precious memory, CPU, and database resources in the process - Basically, we modify the nginx config to add a mapping with a modified user agent `$ua`: ``` map $remote_addr $ua { # 2017-11-08 Random Chinese host grabbing 20,000 PDFs 124.17.34.59 'ChineseBot'; default $http_user_agent; } ``` - If the client's address matches then the user agent is set, otherwise the default `$http_user_agent` variable is used - Then, in the server's `/` block we pass this header to Tomcat: ``` proxy_pass http://tomcat_http; proxy_set_header User-Agent $ua; ``` - Note to self: the `$ua` variable won't show up in nginx access logs because the default `combined` log format doesn't show it, so don't run around pulling your hair out wondering with the modified user agents aren't showing in the logs! - If a client matching one of these IPs connects without a session, it will be assigned one by the Crawler Session Manager Valve - You can verify by cross referencing nginx's `access.log` and DSpace's `dspace.log.2017-11-08`, for example - I will deploy this on CGSpace later this week - I am interested to check how this affects the number of sessions used by the CIAT and Chinese bots (see above on [2017-11-07](#2017-11-07) for example) - I merged the clickable thumbnails code to `5_x-prod` ([#347](https://github.com/ilri/DSpace/pull/347)) and will deploy it later along with the new bot mapping stuff (and re-run the Asible `nginx` and `tomcat` tags) - I was thinking about Baidu again and decided to see how many requests they have versus Google to URL paths that are explicitly forbidden in `robots.txt`: ``` # zgrep Baiduspider /var/log/nginx/access.log* | grep -c -E "GET /(browse|discover|search-filter)" 22229 # zgrep Googlebot /var/log/nginx/access.log* | grep -c -E "GET /(browse|discover|search-filter)" 0 ``` - It seems that they rarely even bother checking `robots.txt`, but Google does multiple times per day! ``` # zgrep Baiduspider /var/log/nginx/access.log* | grep -c robots.txt 14 # zgrep Googlebot /var/log/nginx/access.log* | grep -c robots.txt 1134 ``` - I have been looking for a reason to ban Baidu and this is definitely a good one - Disallowing `Baiduspider` in `robots.txt` probably won't work because this bot doesn't seem to respect the robot exclusion standard anyways! - I will whip up something in nginx later